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abstract 
In Philosophy for Children (P4C), consensus-making is often regarded as something that 
needs to be avoided. P4C scholars believe that consensus-making would dismiss P4C’s 
ideals, such as freedom, inclusiveness, and diversity. This paper aims to counteract such 
assumptions, arguing that P4C scholars tend to focus on a narrow, or universal, concept 
of “consensus” and dismiss various forms of consensus, especially what Niemeyer and 
Dryzek (2007) call meta-consensus. Meta-consensus does not search for universal 
consensus, but focuses on the process by which people achieve various non-universal 
forms of consensus, such as agreement on the value of opponents’ normative view or 
agreement on the degree to which they accept opponents’ view. This paper argues that 
such meta-consensus is a key part of what Clinton Golding (2009) calls “philosophical 
progress,” which is the essential element that makes inquiry philosophical. In other 
words, without meta-consensus and philosophical progress, inquiry ends in merely 
conversation or antagonistic talk. Drawing on the example of P4C conducted with 
Japanese students, this paper shows how meta-consensus is achieved in the community of 
philosophical inquiry and how it contributes to make inquiry philosophical. 
 
keywords: community of philosophical inquiry; consensus; meta-consensus; 
philosophical progress; philosophy for children. 
 
repensando o consenso na comunidade de investigação filosófica: um plano de 
pesquisa 
 
resumo 
No trabalho com Filosofia para Crianças (P4C), o consenso é frequentemente considerado 
como algo que se deve evitar. Pesquisadores acreditam que o consenso destituiria alguns 
ideais da Filosofia para Crianças, como liberdade, inclusão e diversidade. Este artigo visa 
contrariar ou contradizer tais suposições, através da tese de que estes pesquisadores de 
Filosofia para Crianças tendem a focar em um conceito estreito ou universal de 
“consenso”, ignorando diversas formas de consenso, especialmente o que Niemeyer e 
Dryzek (2007) chamam de meta-consenso. Meta-consenso não se trata de uma busca por 
um consenso universal, mas sim do processo pelo qual as pessoas alcançam diversas 
formas de consenso não-universais, como a concordância com o valor da visão normativa 
do oponente ou a concordância com o nível de aceitação deles próprios em relação ao 
ponto de vista do oponente. Este artigo sustenta a tese de que este meta-consenso é uma 
peça importante na composição do que Clinton Golding (2009) chama de “progresso 
filosófico”, que por sua vez é o elemento essencial que faz de uma investigação 
filosófica.Em outras palavras, sem meta-consenso e progresso filosófico, uma investigação 
não passa de mero debate ou uma conversa antagonística. A partir de um exemplo de 
Filosofia para Crianças realizado com estudantes japoneses, este texto mostra como meta-
consenso é alcançado pela comunidade de investigação filosófica e como ele contribui 
para tornar essa investigação realmente filosófica. 
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progresso filosófico; filosofia para crianças. 
 
repensando el consenso en la comunidad de investigación filosófica: una planificación 
de investigación 
 
resumen 
En Filosofía para Niños (FpN), la construcción de consensos es frecuentemente 
considerada como algo que se debe evitar. La creencia entre investigadores de Filosofía 
para Niños es que la construcción de consensos destituirtía algunos ideales de la Filosofía 
para Niños, tales como libertad, inclusión y diversidad. Este artículo tiene como objetivo 
contrarrestar tales suposiciones, argumentando que estos investigadores de Filosofía para 
Niños tienden a centrarse en una concepción estrecha, o universal, de "consenso" y 
descartan variadas formas de consenso, especialmente lo que Niemeyer y Dryzek (2007) 
llaman meta-consenso. El meta-consenso no busca un consenso universal, sino que se 
centra en el proceso por el cual las personas alcanzan diversas formas de consenso no-
universales, tales como el acuerdo en relación al valor de la visión normativa de los 
oponentes o el acuerdo en relación al grado en que aceptan la visión de los oponentes. 
Este artículo sostiene que semejante meta-consenso es una pieza clave en lo que Clinton 
Golding (2009) llama “progreso filosófico”, que es el elemento esencial que vuelve a una 
investigación filosófica. En otras palabras, sin meta-consenso y progreso filosófico, una 
investigación no pasa de mero debate o conversación antagonista. A partir de un ejemplo 
de Filosofía para Niños realizado con estudiantes japoneses, este artículo muestra cómo el 
meta-consenso es alcanzado por la comunidad de investigación filosófica y cómo éste 
contribuye a volver esa investigación filosófica. 
 
palabras clave: comunidad de investigación filosófica; consenso; meta-consenso; progreso 
filosófico; filosofía para niños 
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rethinking consensus in the community of philosophical inquiry: a research agenda 
 
introduction 
This agenda-setting paper aims to encourage scholars in the Philosophy for 
Children (P4C) camp to take consensus into account. P4C focuses on the process of 
deepening children’s understanding of philosophical questions through reason-
exchange and reciprocal listening. In this inquiry process, consensus-making is 
normally regarded as something that should not be established as a primary 
purpose (CASSIDY, et al., 2018; DUNLOP, 2017). Just as existing democratic 
education is criticized in the same manner (e.g. LO, 2017; RUITENBURG, 2009), 
P4C scholars believe that consensus-making would neglect the diversity of 
students’ perspectives and facilitate exclusion of minority voices.  
This paper counteracts such an assumption. It argues that anti-consensus 
assumptions stand upon a narrow conceptualization of consensus, or, more 
specifically, a “universal” account of consensus. While this paper agrees that 
universal consensus-making is not a primary purpose of P4C, it contends that the 
authentic process of philosophical inquiry demands non-universal consensus-
making moments. The community of philosophical inquiry is grounded in what 
Golding (2009) calls “philosophical progress,” a process of iteration between 
problem-solving and problem identification. Importantly, philosophical progress 
requires children to achieve a non-universal consensus (e.g., consensus on the 
reasonableness of the suggested solution, consensus on dissensus); otherwise, 
inquiry ends in merely conversation or antagonistic disputes (GARDNER, 1996; 
TSUCHIYA, 2018). Put differently, given that philosophical progress is the core of 
the authentic community of philosophical inquiry, consensus-making should also 
be taken into account as a core part of P4C.  
To rethink the role of consensus-making in P4C, this paper focuses on what 
Simon Niemeyer and John Dryzek (2007) call meta-consensus. The core idea of 
meta-consensus is that even people who disagree with each other can nonetheless 
achieve a consensus on the degree to which they can accept opponents’ 
perspectives. For example, even if people have a conflicting normative view about 
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a philosophical question (e.g. pro-life versus pro-choice), collaborative inquiry can 
allow them to make consensus on the value of the other side’s opinion and thereby 
to listen together. As such, the idea of meta-consensus offers insight into the way 
in which non-universal forms of consensus-making allow people in conflict to 
collaborate by engaging in a constructive dialogue. On the basis of the idea of 
meta-consensus, this paper makes a case for how meta-consensus can function as 
an enabler of philosophical progress in the community of philosophical inquiry by 
drawing on the findings of a case from Japan.  
This paper is divided into four parts. The first section outlines how P4C and 
consensus-making are seen as strange bedfellows. The second section focuses on 
Golding’s idea of “philosophical progress” as a core element of philosophical 
inquiry and then argues that philosophical progress entails non-universal 
consensus-making moments. The third section introduces the idea of “meta-
consensus” in order to reconsider the meaning of consensus in P4C. To 
understand how meta-consensus occurs in P4C, the fourth section draws on the 
case of a philosophical inquiry conducted with Japanese students. 
 
philosophy for children as democratic education and consensus-making 
Philosophy for Children (P4C) was initially pioneered by Matthew Lipman 
in the 1970s (see LIPMAN, 2003) as an educational practice for critical thinking. To 
date, P4C is introduced in many classrooms and schools as a form of democratic 
education, or what Makaiau (2016) calls “deliberative pedagogy.” P4C is expected 
to cultivate students’ democratic communication capacities, especially reason-
exchange, justification of one’s position, listening, reflective thinking, and creation 
of a moral community (see also BURGH et al., 2006; ŠIMENC, 2009). P4C is also 
expected to facilitate students’ mutual understanding across difference 
(MAKAIAU, 2016). As Burgh (2014) rightly points out, P4C is not just education 
for future democracy but is itself democracy in practice. 
In recent years, democratic education scholars have engaged in great 
controversy over the relationship between democratic education and consensus-
making. According to the literature, existing democratic education tends to focus 
too much on “rational” deliberation that attempts to reach “harmonious” and 
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“universal” consequences, such as consensus-making, and ignores the pluralistic 
as well as conflictual conditions of human existence. Drawing on Mouffe and 
Rancie ̀re’s argument against consensus in deliberative democracy, Ruitenburg 
argues:  
[…] the currently dominant framework of deliberative democracy 
does not sufficiently recognise the constitutive nature of 
disagreement. The deliberative conception of democracy and 
democratic citizenship emphasizes rational deliberation leading to 
political consensus. For Mouffe and Rancière, however, consensus 
means erasing the contestatory, conflictual nature of the very 
givens of common life. (RUITENBURG, 2010, p. 44) 
Echoing Ruitenburg’s arguments, democratic education scholars have 
problematized the meaning of consensus-making in democratic education and, 
instead, contended a need for a shift “from harmony to agonism” (TODD, 2010), 
“from universal to plural” (LO, 2017), or “from consensus to dissensus” (BIESTA, 
2011).  
Similar arguments are also found in the P4C community, as P4C is one 
form of democratic education. Scholars in P4C, in their criticism of consensus, 
ground their rationale in agonistic thought, arguing that consensus may neglect 
differences between students and prevents free inquiry. Consensus is usually 
described as an opposite of P4C’s ideal or something that is not a primary goal, as 
exemplified by the following two excerpts: “It [P4C] prioritises their [students’] 
thinking, and it is recognised that the community many not reach a consensus 
view.” (DUNLOP, 2017, p. 76) 
[…] there is no search for consensus or a conclusion. It is these 
features, amongst others, that suggest CoPI [Community of 
Philosophical Inquiry] might be an appropriate practice in 
supporting the participation of children with emotional-
behavioural and/or communication needs. (CASSIDY et al., 2018, 
p. 5) 
As such, P4C scholars tend to pay limited attention to consensus-making 
processes. Consensus is regarded as a “bad” outcome of philosophical inquiry, as 
it potentially oppresses minority views and instead facilitates domination. 
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philosophical progress without consensus? 
While P4C scholars tend to situate consensus as opposed to philosophical 
inquiry, this article problematizes such a view. More specifically, this article asks: 
is the community of inquiry possible without consensus? This question should be 
taken into consideration seriously, because the community of inquiry is anchored 
in what Golding calls philosophical progress, which inevitably entails a consensus-
making moment, albeit not a “universal” one.  
Philosophical progress is a widely shared view in the P4C community, the 
core claim of which is that inquiry becomes philosophical if it opens up a new 
intellectual navigation. The underlying presupposition here is that the community 
of philosophical inquiry is different from conversation. This view is shared by 
many P4C scholars. According to Gardner, for example, a conversational, not 
philosophical, inquiry would be a “boring” activity. She argues: 
If students believe that they can say whatever comes into their 
heads without having to show how this is important or relevant 
with respect to the topic under discussion, without having to 
engage in conceptual analysis, without having to back their claims 
with reasons, without having to worry about being consistent, 
they may tend to say whatever comes into their heads. 
(GARDNER, 1996, p. 106) 
By Gardner’s account, conversation and philosophical inquiry are different 
activities because, while the former encourages students to say whatever comes 
into their minds, the latter values the process by which students make an effort to 
deepen their understanding of the philosophical question through conceptual 
analysis, reflective reason-exchange, and listening. This inquiry process provides 
students with various intellectual avenue through which they can clarify new 
aspect of the problem, recognize counterclaims, and develop their ideas. As a 
result, students can get clearer conceptual as well as philosophical understanding 
of the question. Golding (2009, p. 245) conceptualizes this process where students 
update their perspectives on the philosophical question as “philosophical 
progress.” He argues that the core of philosophical progress in the community of 
philosophical inquiry is the iteration between problem solving and problem 
identification. More specifically:  
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We make progress through successive iterations of resolving 
problems, where every resolution becomes the source of a new 
problem to be resolved. The original problem arises as an 
incongruous, inadequate conception and we develop a more 
congruous and adequate conception to resolve this problem. 
However, more advanced problems arise, which might be 
previously unnoticed problems, more subtle variations of previous 
problems, or even new information that shows the resolution to be 
problematic. In response we might develop yet more congruous 
and adequate versions of the resolution. Alternatively, we might 
abandon a line of resolution that we judge to be fundamentally in 
error, or develop radical resolutions that were not previously 
available. (GOLDING, 2009, p. 245). 
Through such interactions between problem-solving and problem-
identification, students analyze and develop problems and concepts. Even if they 
reach one resolution, this resolution should be examined from different angles, 
which would help students identify new problems and conceptual findings.2 
Figure 1 below, suggested by Golding, illustrates what philosophical progress 
looks like. 
 
Figure 1. Philosophical progress (GOLDING, 2009, p. 246) 
 
Golding’s argument on philosophical progress is important for rethinking 
the role of consensus in P4C, because his argument implies that students need to 
achieve a specific consensus at each stage of dialogue to move the dialogue 
forward. The term “consensus” here does not imply a harmony-oriented activity 
that unites different opinions and perspectives into a unanimous agreement. Nor 
                                                        
2 Lipman (2003, pp. 92–93) suggested “direction of the community” to argue a similar point, 
though he did not use the term “philosophical progress.” 
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is it a practice that seeks universal solutions or definitions of philosophical 
problems. The term “consensus” here means, for example: 
 
• Participants recognize the multilayered and complex character of the issue 
in question. 
• Participants agree on whether the question is solvable or worth solving. 
• Participants agree on how they recognize and interpret the question.  
• Participants agree on whether to abandon the suggested resolution. 
• Participants recognize whether the new solution is important or not. 
 
Without these consensuses, it would be almost impossible for students to 
go to the next stage of the inquiry.  
The implications of this argument are twofold. First, consensus-making is 
one of the essential parts of the philosophical progress. Without achieving 
consensus in a process of dialogue, the value of the suggested solutions, and a 
recognition of various solutions, philosophical inquiry may end in merely 
conversation or antagonistic dispute. Secondly, even if consensus-making is 
important for philosophical progress, the meaning of consensus should not be 
understood narrowly. Consensus practiced in philosophical inquiry is something 
that is different from a harmonious, universal, and exclusive activity that is 
criticized by agonistic democracy scholars. So, what kind of consensus is it? 
 
from universal consensus to meta-consensus 
In responding to this question, this paper suggests that the idea of “meta-
consensus” originally suggested by Niemeyer and Dryzek (2007) would offer 
valuable insights. Focusing on meta-consensus would be a good starting point 
because this idea provides a model of non-universal consensus and allows us to 
understand how norms of P4C (e.g. inclusiveness, diversity) and consensus-
making are compatible. Put differently, the idea of meta-consensus would help us 
rethink how consensus-making and philosophical progress happen without 
neglecting inclusiveness and diversity of views. 
The idea of meta-consensus emerged from deliberative democracy studies. 
Inspired by Rawls (1996) and Harbermas (1984), early deliberative democrats 
argued that one of the key aims of deliberation is to achieve a consensus through 
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rational, authentic, and reciprocal communication among citizens (see COHEN, 
1998). For example, Niemeyer and Dryzek (2007, p. 503) classify three types of 
consensus that often happen during deliberation: normative consensus, epistemic 
consensus, and preference consensus.  
Normative consensus is an agreement on the values that should predominate 
deliberation. For example, Niemeyer and Dryzek draw on the case of public 
deliberation about the road-building in Bloomfield, Australia, and show three 
different types of normative view (the needs of the community are most 
important; the needs of the environment are most important; both are equally 
important). When people make an agreement about these normative views, we 
can say that a normative consensus has been achieved.  
Epistemic consensus refers to an agreement on people’s beliefs regarding the 
impact of the consequences of deliberation. In the road-building case, there are 
also three conflicting epistemic views (the road will benefit the community; the 
road will negatively impact the environment; the road will benefit the 
environment). If participants reconcile these views, we can say there is an 
epistemic consensus. 
Preference consensus is about “the degree of agreement about what should be 
done” (NIEMEYER & DRYZEK, 2007, p. 505). In the road-building case, there are 
two possible consequences (keep the road; close the road). When participants rank 
their expressed preference and there is an agreement on what is the most 
agreeable consequence (or most non-agreeable consequence), we can say a 
preference consensus is made.  
Niemeyer and Dryzek acknowledge that it is hard to realize these three 
forms of consensus, especially when the topic is highly contested, or deliberation 
is conducted in a deeply divided society. Nevertheless, they argue that, even 
though people fail to make these consensuses, a well-functioning deliberation can 
help them make consensus at a meta level, which is what we call meta-consensus 
(2007, pp. 503–506). 
In normative meta-consensus, participants do not need to have normative 
uniformity at the substantive level; instead, they can agree that opponents have 
rethinking consensus in the community of philosophical inquiry: a research agenda 
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legitimate normative values about the issue in question. In the case of road-
building, for example, participants disagree with each other as they privilege the 
value of community over environment and vice versa. Yet they can achieve 
normative meta-consensus when they understand that the others have legitimate 
values that are worth considering.  
In epistemic meta-consensus, participants are not required to agree on one 
another’s beliefs about the impact of the consequences of deliberation. Yet they 
can achieve meta-consensus when they agree on the credibility of such beliefs. 
Even if the other side has “irrelevant” beliefs, participants can acknowledge that 
the beliefs are reasonable to hold. When the issue is highly complex, people 
sometimes have “wrong” beliefs grounded in misinformation or biased 
information. But by facilitating participants’ mutual listening and communication, 
deliberation enables participants to have an opportunity to express why and how 
they believe what they do about the issue and thereby to understand why the 
others have their own beliefs. This belief-sharing experience can provide a first 
step toward accommodating different perspectives and allowing participants to 
collaborate together. 
In preference meta-consensus, participants do not need to reach a universal 
agreement on the possible consequence and decision, but instead to agree on the 
degree to which they accept alternatives. In the road-building case, for example, 
participants are divided into “close the road” and “road construction.” But if they 
share the view that the degree of access is the most important dimension of the 
issue, they may agree on alternative preferences (e.g., the road will be constructed 
but used only for four-wheel cars) or make an effort to find a point of agreement. 
These three forms of meta-consensus offer insight into the way in which we 
understand the relationship between philosophical progress and consensus-
making. This is because these three forms of meta-consensus enable us to explain 
how different students contribute to progress inquiry philosophically by 
recognizing the value of different (or sometimes opposing) views, examining 
different solutions to philosophical problems, and making decisions about 
whether the suggested solution is worthy of investigation.  
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For example, in an authentic community of philosophical inquiry, students 
may disagree with each other about their normative values (e.g., utilitarian values 
versus deontological values), yet in order to advance their inquiry, they have to 
recognize that the other side has a legitimate normative value (normative meta-
consensus). Otherwise, their inquiry ends in merely a quarrel with no reciprocal 
listening. In addition, when a student proposes possible solutions, the other 
students need to provide that student with an opportunity to explain why the 
solution is worth considering, so that everyone can share underlying experiences, 
knowledge, and/or assumptions of the expressed belief (epistemic meta-
consensus). Without epistemic meta-consensus, they may lose an opportunity to 
examine whether the expressed belief is reasonable and credible. Also, if 
resolutions have been suggested in order to move the inquiry forward, they need 
to examine the degree to which the suggested resolution is acceptable (preference 
meta-consensus). Otherwise, it would be hard for them to consider a new 
philosophical problem, abandon the resolution, or develop a radical line of 
resolution. In a nutshell, students’ efforts to achieve normative, epistemic, and 
preference meta-consensus would help philosophical progress. 
In addition to these three forms of (meta-)consensus in philosophical 
inquiry, this paper also suggests that there is (meta-)consensus on communication 
norms, which is a key to realizing what Lipman (2003) calls the “self-correction” 
capacity of philosophical inquiry. As indicated in the previous section, 
philosophical inquiry is anchored by normative views on rational communication, 
such as active listening, reason-exchange without interruption, reflective and 
critical thinking, respecting different views, and so forth (see LIPMAN, 2003, pp. 
95–100). In the real world, however, it would be rare for students to engage in all 
of these ideal communications in one practice. Instead, as Golding (2013, p. 15) 
indicates, in a successful philosophical inquiry, students make an agreement about 
whether the inquiry is practiced in a relevant manner, asking and checking 
whether they engage in good communication and what sort of communication 
they have to engage in to move their inquiry forward. In other words, even if not 
all students achieve a universal consensus on normative communicative behavior 
rethinking consensus in the community of philosophical inquiry: a research agenda 
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during an inquiry (e.g., some students may behave in a disruptive manner), they 
can achieve meta-consensus on communication norms by modifying irrelevant 
communications.  
 
meta-consensus in the community of philosophical inquiry 
So far, we have seen four types of meta-consensus that can be practiced in 
an authentic community of philosophical inquiry. Table 1 below is a visual 
summary of the above argument (see also NIEMEYER & DRYZEK, 2007). 
 
Table 1. Consensus and meta-consensus in the community of philosophical inquiry 
 Value Belief Preference Communication 
Consensus Normative 
consensus 
Epistemic 
consensus 
Preference 
consensus 
Communication 
norm consensus 
Meta-
consensus 
Recognizing that 
the other 
students have a 
legitimate value 
concerning the 
issue and that 
this value is 
worthy of 
investigation. 
Recognition 
and acceptance 
of 
reasonableness 
of other 
students’ belief 
in suggested 
resolutions and 
new problems.   
Agreement on 
the degree to 
which 
students 
accept the 
suggested 
resolutions 
and/or new 
problems. 
Agreement on 
whether their 
inquiry is practiced 
based on 
relevant/democratic 
forms of 
communication. 
 
We now turn to look at one example of a community of philosophical 
inquiry practiced with Japanese students (aged 13–14). The data was gained on 11 
November 2016 from a P4C classroom in one private school in Saitama prefecture, 
Japan. The author conducted ethnographical fieldwork between September to 
December in 2016, which included participatory observation (N = 39), in-depth 
interviews with teachers and students (N = 19), and action research (see also 
NISHIYAMA, 2018). The data is analyzed through a “qualitative thematic 
analysis”—a systematic classification of the data based on the coding—based on 
the four coding themes: normative (meta)consensus, epistemic (meta)consensus, 
preference (meta)consensus, and communication norm (meta)consensus. 
The topic of inquiry was “gender inequality in Japan.” The main question 
was “Are Japanese women less privileged than men?” During the dialogue, 
students analyzed the concept of “gender,” “inequality,” and “power” in order to 
deepen their understanding of gender inequality. This paper draws on this case 
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because it shows that while the inquiry was seemingly just a quarrel, in which 
students were divided into “male-centric” and “feminism” groups and there 
seemed no room for philosophical progress, they made an effort to achieve meta-
consensus at the normative, epistemic, and communication norm levels, thereby 
making philosophical progress possible, although they failed to achieve 
preference (meta)consensus. 
 
normative (meta-)consensus 
In the inquiry, students had two opposite normative views on gender 
inequality in Japan. On the one hand, a group of female students problematized 
gender inequality as one of the crucial problems in Japanese society. On the other 
hand, a group of male students argued that gender inequality is not an urgent 
issue that ought to be resolved immediately, because they thought that gender 
inequality is almost resolved. For example, one male student indicated that “in 
Japanese politics, more and more female politicians are elected, such as Yuriko 
Koike, the first female governor of Tokyo, and thus I think the current status of 
women in Japan is dramatically improved” (Student 6, male). Table 2 below 
summarizes the disputed normative values concerning gender inequality in Japan. 
 
Table 2. Disputed normative claim on gender inequality in Japan 
Male-centric There are more urgent and important issues than gender inequality 
because gender inequality is almost improved. 
Feminism Gender inequality is the most important topic to discuss because it has 
been creating problematic path-dependencies. 
 
If the two sides remain as far apart as ever, there may be no philosophical 
progress either. Even if students can engage in a quarrel, they may fail to find a 
way of developing, sophisticating, and elaborating their understanding of gender 
inequality.  
On the face of it, students were polarized. However, when seen from a 
different angle, it is possible to say that they made several normative meta-
consensuses, despite their disagreement on the normative value. For example, 
after one male student (Student 15) compared gender inequality in Japan to that in 
rethinking consensus in the community of philosophical inquiry: a research agenda 
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other countries, another male student (Student 6) accepted part of the female 
students’ claim. He argues, 
I still think women already play an active role in Japan. But, as 
Student 15 said, Japan ranked at 120 among developed countries, 
according to the UN statistics on gender equality. So, compared 
with other countries, hmm, yes, I agree that Japan is a male-centric 
society.  
While he argued at the beginning of the inquiry that gender inequality is 
already improved in Japanese society, he acknowledged that Japan is a male-
centric society when he compared Japan with other developed countries, which 
enabled him to accept part of the female students’ claim as legitimate. Even if 
students were still divided regarding their normative consensus on gender 
inequality in Japan, they made normative meta-consensus by sharing the view 
that gender inequality is a legitimate topic to be explored through inquiry. 
 
epistemic (meta-)consensus 
Each group explained their various beliefs about why they thought gender 
inequality is already resolved (or not). As Table 3 illustrates, the male student 
pointed out examples of women-only train cars and women’s right to vote, and 
concluded that women, as well as men, benefit from society. On the other hand, 
the female students criticized this view, arguing that women are still 
disadvantaged, as typically found in the example of sexual harassment, the wage 
gap between men and women, and the small number of female politicians.  
 
Table 3. Disputed epistemic claims on gender inequality in Japan 
Male-centric Women get as many benefits today as men get, such as women-only 
train cars and the right to vote. 
Feminism Women are more disadvantaged than men, as shown by the wage gap, 
sexual harassment, and the rarity of female politicians. 
 
The arguments made by both sides are more or less biased or based on 
misinformation. For example, there is a women-only train car not because society 
privileges them, but because women face a higher risk of being sexually assaulted 
than men do. On the other hand, men as well as women are subjected to sexual 
harassment. This implies that the participants in the inquiry may not be able to 
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move their inquiry forward if they fail to recognize that their belief is grounded in 
biased information, and they have biased assumptions about gender. So students 
asked questions in order to clarify whether the expressed belief is grounded in 
reasonable assumptions and information. For example, 
Student 1 (female): In sports, I often feel that audiences tend to focus on 
men’s games rather than women’s. 
Student 2 (male): Oh, I don’t think so. Recently the women’s soccer game 
receives great attention. 
Student 1 (female): But they are called “women’s” soccer. We usually do not 
say “men’s” soccer. Women’s soccer receives attention 
because it is rare and played by women.  
Student 3 (female): Yeah. True. Men are more advantaged, although this is 
not visible. 
Student 10 (male): People pay special attention to women because women 
are in a relatively low status. Women are still in a weak 
position. 
While Student 2 offered counterexamples to criticize Student 1’s claim, 
Student 1 gave evidence regarding women’s soccer to justify her position. As a 
result, other students recognized that Student 1’s belief is acceptable because they 
believed that it is based on a reasonable assumption. As such, while they 
disagreed with each other in terms of their epistemic beliefs, they achieved 
epistemic meta-consensus. 
 
preference (meta-)consensus 
In the inquiry, students failed to establish both preference consensus and 
preference meta-consensus. Students attempted to progress their inquiry by 
providing several resolutions, yet they disagreed with each other about the degree 
to which they could accept the resolution. As Table 4 illustrates, students 
expressed two opposite preferences for how to deal with gender inequality: status 
quo (the male group) and privileging women (the female group). Although, as we 
have seen, students achieved normative meta-consensus about the significance of 
rethinking consensus in the community of philosophical inquiry: a research agenda 
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discussing gender inequality in Japan, they persisted in their positions and their 
opposite views were not reconciled throughout the inquiry.  
 
Table 4. Disputed preference on gender inequality in Japan 
Male-centric Status quo 
Feminism We need something that makes women more privileged socially and 
economically.  
 
communication norm (meta-)consensus 
Lipman’s normative view (2003) indicates that philosophical inquiry needs 
to be inclusive and care-based activity in order to enable free and equal inquiry. In 
the case of Japanese students’ dialogue, students are announced the significance of 
such inclusiveness and caring, yet in reality they often fail to practice it. For 
example, during the inquiry, male students talked over 40 times, whereas female 
students talked only 11 times. Since philosophical progress requires a variety of 
perspectives, ensuring equal opportunity to voice opinions would be the key 
normative mission in P4C.  
Although students failed to engage in normative forms of dialogue, some 
male students attempted to check whether their communication was inclusive. For 
example, when male students dominated the inquiry without providing female 
students with opportunities to voice their opinions, some male students cautioned 
their peers in following manner: 
Student 3 (male): I think the girls may have something to say. We need to 
ask them. 
Student 4 (male): The girls did not speak yet.  
In addition, when a male student rejected a female student’s belief, several 
male students cautioned: 
Students (males): No, you shouldn’t deny it [her opinion]. This is not a 
debate. We have to do dialogue without rejection. 
Although the overall process of dialogue was male-centric, some students 
attempted to check the inclusiveness of their dialogue and to share what good 
dialogue ought to be. As such, their effort contributed to enhancing the self-critical, 
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or what Lipman (2003) calls “self-correction,” capacity of community of 
philosophical inquiry. 
 
conclusion  
In this paper, we have seen that the community of philosophical inquiry in 
P4C and consensus-making are not strange bedfellows. Although P4C does not 
require a universal account of consensus-making, it requires other forms of 
consensus-making to make philosophical progress possible. Drawing on the 
concepts of normative, epistemic, preference and communication norm meta-
consensus, this paper demonstrates that meta-consensus-making would be 
beneficial in facilitating philosophical progress in a different manner, not by 
uniting different views into a single box, but by respecting such differences.  
From a practitioner’s point of view, the idea of meta-consensus offers the 
insight into how we can assess the quality of philosophical inquiry. Even if 
students fail to engage in “good” inquiry on the face of it, meta-consensus enables 
practitioners to interpret the quality of inquiry from meta-angles. For example, in 
the case of Japan, students fail to achieve normative, epistemic, preference, and 
communication norm consensuses throughout the inquiry. Quite often, such 
inquiry is evaluated as “low quality.” Yet, as this paper shows, students achieve 
normative, epistemic, and communication norm consensus at a meta-level, 
although they failed to achieve preference meta-consensus because they attached 
their preference to the given dichotomy (status quo versus change) without 
listening to the other side. Hence, the idea of meta-consensus tells us not only 
whether there is philosophical progress, but also what kind of philosophical 
progress students can achieve (or not). 
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